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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

:

Case No. 880269-CA

:

ALLEN DWAINE OLSEN, MICHAEL
:
PAYNE WARNICK and DONALD RAY
HATCH,
:
Defendant-Appellants. :

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants were convicted of theft under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-6-404, a third degree felony, on January 22, 1988, and
sentenced on March 16, 1988. Their notice of appeal was filed in
district court on April 13, 1988 (T. 184). Under Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-3, an under Utah Court of Appeals Rule 4(a), jurisdiction
is proper in this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendants of
theft?
II. Did the prosecution prejudice the trial of
defendants by failing to "disclose" oral statements made by the
defendants, in violation of the rules of discovery, and if so,
did defendants respond to this violation in a manner that
preserved their objection?
III. Did defendants preserve for appeal their argument
that the prosecution's rebuttal witness should not have been

allowed to testify because the prosecution had not listed her as
a prospective witness, and if so, did the trial court abuse its
discretion, and thereby commit prejudicial error in allowing the
witness to testify?
IV. Did the court err in giving the jury instruction on
transporting cattle without proof of ownership?
V.

Did the prosecutor conduct himself improperly, and

thereby prejudice the trial of defendants, in quoting during
opening arguments an oral statement of one of the defendants,
which statement was not admitted at trial, and if so, did
defendants preserve this argument for appeal?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Controlling constitutional and statutory provisions are
provided in full, as they appear in the text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged by information signed on
September 6, 1987, with theft, a third degree felony violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404. The information alleged that "on or
about the 29th day of August, 1987, [defendants did] obtain and
exercise unauthorized control over seven (7) head of cattle owned
by A. C. EKker at Robber's Roost in Wayne County, Utah, a Third
Degree Felony."

(R. 1). Preliminary hearing was held on

September 8, 1987, at which time the information was read, and
all defendants waived their right to an arraignment and pleaded
not guilty, and were bound over to district court (R. 9, 38).
Jury trial was held on January 21 and 22, 1988. On
January 22, 1988, defendants were convicted of violating Utah

Code Ann. S 76-6-404, the theft statute (R. 167). On March 16,
1988, each defendant was sentenced to serve one to five years in
prison (R. 182). That sentence was suspended, and defendants
were ordered to serve one year in the Wayne County Jail, and to
serve eighteen months' probation after the year in jail (R. 182).
They were also fined $5,000 and ordered to pay a 25% victim
reparation fee and restitution (R. 174).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wayne County Sheriff, Kerry Bruce Ekker, testified that
on August 29, 1987, he received a message-which influenced him to
drive to the Robber's Roost, Hans Flat area of Wayne County (T.
33-34).

He checked for vehicle tracks, and found tracks of a

"six-foot axle, pulling an eight-foot axle trailer" heading north
toward the Spur area, and suspected that those tracks were made
by the "vehicle [he] was looking for" (T. 34-35).

He waited for

four hours for the vehicle to return through the necessary
passageway out of the area, which was near the unmanned ranger
station (T. 35). After the defendants pulling a trailer full of
cattle came into his sight, Sheriff Ekker stopped the defendants
(T. 36).
When Sheriff Ekker asked the driver of the truck whose
cattle they were hauling, the driver of the truck, Mr. Hatch,
responded, "I don't know." (T. 36-37).

After contesting that

response from Mr. Hatch, the sheriff placed defendants under
arrest for theft and read them their rights (T. 37). After the
defendants indicated that they understood their rights (T. 39), a
Mr. Hunt drove defendants' truck and trailer, and the defendants

were transported to jail (T. 40). Defendant Warwick rode with
Sheriff Ekker, and defendants Hatch and Olsen were transported by
Deputy Brinkerhoff (T. 41).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence and conclusions to be inferred therefrom
in this case support defendants' convictions.
During the trial, defendants waived any objection to
the prosecution's alleged failure to disclose oral statements of
defendants.

Because defendants never requested disclosure of

oral statements, and knew that the prosecution did not view their
discovery request as inclusive of oral statements, they are in no
position to claim that the rules of discovery were violated by
the prosecution in this case.
During the trial, defendants also waived their
opportunity to pursue on appeal their objection to the testimony
of Mrs. Hatch.

The prosecution was under no duty to disclose the

name of the rebuttal witness.

Particularly in view of the

evidence of defendants' commission of the crime for which they
were convicted, defendants cannot claim that the trial court's
decision to allow the rebuttal witness to testify constituted
prejudicial error.
Because defendants' jurors, operating under the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard, convicted defendants
of theft, this Court need not review the lesser included offense
instruction drafted by defendants.

Mootness of the question

aside, the trial court's decision to inform the jurors of the law
on transporting cattle without proof of ownership was appropriate

in the context of this case and the other instructions that were
given.
Defendants waived their argument for prosecutorial
misconduct at trial, and the statement the prosecutor quoted
during his opening argument properly could have been presented to
the jury, the prosecutor's conduct during the opening argument
was appropriate,
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT.
The information with which

defendants were charged

with theft alleged that "on or about the 29th of August, 1987,
[defendants did] obtain and exercise unauthorized control over
seven (7) head of cattle owned by A. C. Ekker at Robber's Roost
in Wayne County, Utah with intention to deprive the owner
thereof."

(R. 139).
On appeal, defendants challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence presented at trial demonstrating their intent to deprive
A. C. Ekker of the cattle, claiming that the evidence shows that
defendants didn't know they were taking anyone's property, but
believed that they were adopting wild cows (Appellants' brief 1722).
The standard of review of a claim of insufficiency of
evidence is set forth in State v. Walker, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
(Utah 1988):
On appeal, it is the defendant's burden to
establish that the evidence at trial was so
inconclusive or insubstantial as to preclude the jury
from properly finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
See State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). In

reviewing the conviction, we do not substitute our
judgment for that of the jury. "So long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
Ld. at 30.
All three defendants relied on the testimony of
defendant Hatch (T. 185) to present to the jury their argument
that they thought the cattle they took were wild, and there for
the taking.

Viewing his testimony, in combination with the

testimony of other witnesses, this Court should conclude that the
jurors in this case could have, acting within reason, found
defendants guilty

of theft beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant Hatch, himself an owner of over fifty head of
cattle running on a government allotment, a man who had been
around the cattle business for twenty-eight years, a man who had
unbranded calves of his own (T. 154), and a man who admitted at
trial that if cattle are on private property or other private
arrangement, as opposed to the open range, they need not be
branded (T. 173), told the jurors in this case that he and the
other defendants drove over a cattle guard and past a sign saying
"A. C. Ekker Ranch 7 miles" (T. 162) to catch some wild cows.
The cattle taken were Texas longhorns, unique in color,
size, and in their horns from other cattle raised in the area (R.
30, 77-78), the first of which was imported to the Ekker
allotment in 1978 (T. 100). In the words of defendant Hatch,
w

They were small ratty looking cattle, them bred cattle I guess

you'd call them what I hear." (T. 160). Indeed, defendant Hatch
not only had heard about the longhorns, but had researched them

and expressed an interest in owning some before the thefts
occurred (T. 188-189).
Defendant Hatch testified if defendants had seen one
branded cow in proximity to those that defendants took, they
wouldn't have taken any, because one branded cow was sufficient
proof of ownership of the unbranded cattle accompanying branded
ones (T. 166, 179, 181). Indeed, so diligent were defendants in
insuring that they saw and took no cattle bearing marks of
domestication, that they checked for injection scars inside the
ears of every cow that they saw (even the ones they didn't
take)(T. 163, 169).
At the time of arrest, defendants' trailer contained
unusual roping equipment (T. 58), two calves, a two-year-old
longhorn hereford cross bull, a two-year old heifer, a yearling
heifer, a year-old bull, and a four-year-old cow (R. 52-56).
Two of the animals were four months old, were not weaned, and
were not with their mothers (T. 57). Sheriff Ekker testified
that they had been taken from their mothers on the day of the
theft (T. 78). Mr. Hatch testified that defendants took the
cattle home "and rope at them a little bit and maybe put some
weight on them and dress 'em out." (T. 172).
Mr. A. C. Ekker explained how defendant's choice to
take the two unweaned calves indicated that the calves were in
the presence of branded cattle:
A That isn't correct because if you had a choice
and you were taking a critter to market or if you were
taking a critter for your own use, you would not choose
a calf. You would choose a critter that was old enough
to be a mother. A calf, you have to keep her until
she's three before she has her first baby. How much

production is that? If her mother was unbranded and
you knew she had a calf on her, she's gonna have a calf
next year, I'd take the mother; wouldn't you,
Q Well I guess that would depend on how hard it
was to catch the mother.
A They had mothers and bulls the same size as the
mothers to the calves in the trailer. So apparently
they could accomplish that.
(T. 127). Mr. Hatch testified that the mothers of the calves
bore no brands, and that the reason that he didn't take one of
the two mother cows was that she was too far from the trailer to
drag in (T. 166). He provided no explanation for his choice of
the other calf over the other mother cow.
A. C. Ekker, the owner of the allotment on which the
cattle were taken, testified that in isolated areas, five percent
of the animals rounded up are unbranded (T. 103). Mr. Stanley
Adams of the Bureau of Land Management testified that on each of
his trips through the A. C. Ekker allotment, he saw at least one
branded head of cattle (T. 151-152).

Mr. A. C. Ekker and three

other cowboys were in the area where the thefts occurred during
November and December of 1987, the year of the thefts, gathering
cattle (T. 195-96).

They corralled fourteen head of cattle in

one day, and found none that were unbranded except for unweaned
calves (T. 196). Two days after the thefts, Mr. A. C. Ekker was
in the area of the thefts and he saw some branded cattle (T.
197).
Throughout the opening statement of defendants, the
testimony of defendant Hatch, and defendants' appellate brief,
defendants have steadfastly maintained that they took the cattle
from the Ekker allotment with the sincere belief that the cattle

were there, waiting to be claimed by the first person able to
catch them.

Yet when defendants were arrested with the cattle in

their trailer, and Sheriff Ekker asked them, "Whose cattle are
those?", defendant Hatch replied "I don't know." (T. 36-37).
Defendants' jurors, given the opportunity to hear this
evidence, and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses,
surely would have been acting within reason in concludin6g that
defendants had the intent to steal the cattle, and were guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of theft.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULES OF
DISCOVERY IN "FAILING TO DISCLOSE"
DEFENDANTS' ORAL STATEMENTS, AND DEFENDANTS
HAVE NOT PRESERVED THIS ARGUMENT FOR APPEAL.
During the opening statement of the Wayne County
prosecutor, Tex Olsen, he quoted an oral statement made by
defendant Warwick at the time of arrest, "We are not going
through all that rigmarole [trial process].... I'm guilty and I
know it." (T. 15). This quotation drew an objection from defense
counsel, who claimed at the subsequent bench conference that the
oral statements of the defendants should be excluded from
evidence, because the prosecution had failed to produce them in
response to defendants' discovery requests (T. 15).
A. Defendants Waived Their Right To Raise Their
Allegation That The Prosecution Violated The Rules
Of Discovery In Failing To Disclose Defendants'
Oral Statements.
The remedies for defendants claiming prosecutorial
violation of the rules of criminal discovery are provided in Utah
Code Ann. S 77-35-16(g), which reads as follows:

If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court
that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or
inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
The only relief requested by defendants in the instant
case was exclusion of evidence, which the trial court granted.
The fact that the defendants wanted no relief other than the
exclusion of the statements and were willing to proceed with the
trial after the jurors heard the prosecutor quote the only oral
statement of any defendant that was quoted during the trial, is
exemplified by their failure to request a continuance or a
mistrial.

Following the trial court's ruling excluding the oral

statements of defendants, and in response to the State's motion
for a mistrial, defense counsel responded, "Your Honor, let me
indicate in response to the motion, we do oppose the motion.

Our

clients are here for their day in Court." (T. 92). Mr. Means did
not dispute this statement.

During the entire trial, none of the

defendants ever requested any relief other than suppression of
the evidence; the trial court's indication that the oral
statements of defendants might be admissible if the defendants
testified raised no argument from the defendants (T. 93).
In State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), the
defendant was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery and
two counts of aggravated assault.

On appeal, the defendant

raised an objection to the prosecution's compliance with a
discovery order, noting that although the defense had obtained a
court order for the prosecution to disclose all statements made

by the defendant, the prosecution had failed to disclose a
statement made by the defendant to his arresting officer until
shortly before trial.

When the prosecution offered this evidence

of defendant's statement during rebuttal, defendant objected
unsuccessfully, and subsequently moved for a mistrial.

The

supreme court, in rejecting this claim of discovery violation,
explained how a defendant's conduct upon discovering the
previously undisclosed evidence may dispose of any objection to
the prosecution's conduct during discovery:
A pivotal fact in our reversal of Knight was
defense counsel's timely efforts to obtain relief in
order to mitigate the potential or suffered prejudice
caused by the prosecutor's wrongful conduct. Such was
not the case at defendant's trial. Despite being
informed of defendant's statements prior to trial and
having reasonable knowledge that such statements might
be used by the prosecution, defense counsel did not
move for a continuance, to which he would have been
entitled. Thus, under the facts of this case, we
conclude that defendant waived relief under rule 16(g)
as implemented in Knight by not making timely efforts
to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice accused by the
prosecutor's conduct.
Id. at 882-883 (footnotes omitted).
Comparison of the instant case with numerous others
demonstrates that defendants' failure to mitigate the impact of
the evidence that they claim surprised them at trial precludes
arguments of reversible error on appeal.

Compare State v.

Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919, n. 6 (Utah 1987)(noting prior Utah
cases in which defendants failures to seek adequate rule 16(g)
remedies constituted waiver of discovery violation claim); State
v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275-276 (Utah 1985)(defendant's claim
of violation of discovery, based on prosecution's failure to
produce notes from interview with prosecution witness, was

minimized by the fact that defendant did not demand to see the
notes at trial when he became aware of them);

State v. Harris,

14 Wash.App. 414, 542 P.2d 122, 126 (1975)(remedy for defendant,
surprised by rebuttal witness testimony, is request for
continuance).
This Court should not allow defendants to resurrect on
appeal their argument of discovery violation, which they so
clearly laid to rest at trial.
B. Defendants Did Not Request Production Of
Their Oral Statements.
Defendants Warnick and Olsen submitted a request for
discovery seeking
1. Relevant written or recorded statements] of
Defendants, Allen Dwaine Olsen or Michael Payne Warwick
or their co-defendant Donald Ray Hatch[.]
(R. 11). Defendant Hatch's initial discovery request, dated
September 29, 1987, also requested H[a]ny written or recorded
statements of the defendant or any co-defendants." (R. 25). The
statements now at issue were oral statements, which were never
written or recorded (R. 42-43).

None of the discovery requests

submitted by defendants requested oral statements.
During the arguments to the trial court, defense
counsel stated,
The reason that that is worded such in our demand for
discovery is that's taken right from the statutory
language under rule, if I'm not mistaken. I think the
implication of that rule is that in asking for a
statement of your client, you're not limiting the
request to something that someone might have written
down, necessarily, but it's standard procedure that it
is written down.

(T. 47). The rule to which defense counsel referred to, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-35-16, states in part,
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request the
following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or co-defendants[.]
(empha sis added).
This Court should not condone defendants' broad
definition of the phrase "written or recorded statements".

The

Knight court emphasized that "the discovery request must be
sufficiently specific to permit the prosecution to understand
what is sought and to justify the parallel assumption

on the

part of the defense that material not produced does not exist."
id. at 917.
Not only would the adoption of defendants' broad
definition of "written or recorded statements" undermine Knight's
edict for specific drafting of discovery requests, but also, it
would impose upon the prosecution and all related investigative
agencies the burden of memorializing all potential witness
statements.

Without memorializing all potential witness

statements, the prosecution and investigative agencies could not
comply with the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-16(a)(1)
placed before this Court by defendants.

Such expansive

interpretation is not appropriate under general rules of
statutory construction, or under Utah law.

As stated by Judge

Garff in his dissenting opinion in State v. Wight, 97 Utah Adv.
Rep. 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1988),

Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous,
the statute must be held to mean what its language
plainly expresses. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory
Construction section 46.01 (4th Ed. 1984). In
construing such a statute, we must, therefore, give
effect to Congress's underlying intent by assuming that
each term in the statute was used advisedly, Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 672
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), giving the words their ordinary,
plain meaning unless there is something in the total
context of the legislation which would justify a
different meaning.
Id. at 33.
Numerous courts have rejected arguments, similar to
those of defendants in this case, for broad and unusual
interpretations of the language in various discovery statutes.
See State v. Escherivel, 113 Ariz. 330,

552 P.2d 1194, 1195

(1976)(defendants' oral statements to arresting officer were not
discoverable pursuant to statute defining discoverable statements
of defendants, which included recorded statements, written
verbatim and written summaries of oral statements, and written,
signed statements, and motion for mistrial based on violation of
discovery rules was properly denied.); State v. Cripps, 177 Mont.
410, 582 P.2d 312, 317 (1978)(discovery request for written and
recorded statements did not entitle defendant to oral statement
of witness); Watts v. State, 487 P.2d 981, 986 (Okl.Cr.
1971)(defendant's request for "The following papers, to-wit: any
and all statements made by defendant herein" did not entitle him
to production of his oral statements, which the court found he
did not request), modified on other grounds, 507 P.2d 915
(Okl.Cr. 1973); People v. Garcia, 627 P.2d 255, 258-259 (Colo.
App. 1980)(prosecutor, under court order to provide defendant
with relevant "written or recorded statements or summaries of

statements" was not obligated to reduce witness's oral statement
to writing and provide it to defendant); State v. McKendall# 36
Or.App.187, 584 P.2d 316, 321-322 (1978)(discovery statute
providing disclosure of "memoranda of any oral statements" did
not require state to memorialize and disclose oral statements);
State v. Bright, 229 Kan. 185, 623 P.2d 917, 919-920
(1981)(readout of gas chromotograph spectophotometer was not a
"statement" discoverable under the rules of discovery); State v.
Haynes, 49 Or.App 89, 619 P.2d 889, 894-895 (1980)(detective's
chart used during witness interview to refresh the witness's
memory of the crime, which chart bore paraphrases of the
witness's comments, was not discoverable as a statement of a
witness); Wright v. State, 501 P.2d 1360, 1370-1371 (Alaska
1972)(district attorney's notes from witness interview did not
constitute statement discoverable under state Jencks Act); State
v. Smallwoodf 223 Kan. 320, 574 P.2d 1361, 1364-1365
(1978)(attorney's notes of witness interview, which had not been
read back to and adopted by witness were not discoverable under
state Jencks Act); State v. Gardner, 5 Or.App. 493, 484 P.2d 851,
852 (1971)(under state Jencks act, attorney's interview notes
were not discoverable as statement of witness); State v. Hinton,
680 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1984)(discovery statute providing
disclosure of statements of co-defendants did not mandate
discovery statements of co-conspirator, who was tried separately
from defendant).
Defendants' objection to the prosecution's failure to
"disclose" the oral statements of defendants in response to their

discovery request for "written or recorded" statements is without
merit.
C. There Was No Knight Violation In This Case,
And Had There Been, It Would Have Been Harmless.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states
in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request the
following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the
defendant or co-defendants;
....

(5) Any other item of evidence which the court
determines on good cause shown should be made available
to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, (Utah 1987), the
court defined a two step inquiry for reviewing allegations of
violations of discovery rules: "first,

whether the State's

failure to disclose ... was error, second, if error was
committed, whether defendant suffered prejudice sufficient to
warrant reversal."

Knight at 916.

In approaching the first

step, this Court should look at "[t]he starting place for
analyzing the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct...
defendant's motion to discover."

^d. at 916.

In the instant

case, defendants requested, among other things, written or
recorded statements of defendants (R. 11, 25). As explained
above, because the evidence in dispute on appeal was not listed
in the discovery request, this Court should reject defendants'
Knight argument at this point (in the event that this Court
chooses to analyze this point at all beyond noting defendants'

waiver at trial).

For purposes of argument only, the State will

assume that defendants requested production of oral statements.
Assuming, arguendo, that defendants had requested the
production of oral statements, that request would have fallen
under subsection (5) of Rule 16, which requires either the
defendant's obtaining a court order for the cooperation of the
prosecution or voluntary compliance by the prosecution.

Inasmuch

as defendants did not seek a court order for oral statements, it
is appropriate for this Court to follow the Knight analysis for
voluntary compliance:
First, the prosecution either must produce all of the
material requested or must identify explicitly those
portions of the request with respect to which no
responsive material will be provided. Second, when the
prosecution agrees to produce any of the material
requested, it must continue to disclose such material
on an ongoing basis to the defense.
Id. at 916, 917.
The prosecutor indicated well in advance of trial that
he did not view oral statements as included in defendants'
request for written or recorded statements.

The fact that

defendants were aware of the prosecution's refusal to produce
oral statements in response to defendants request for written or
recorded statements is proved by review of the trial transcript,
in which counsel for defendants demonstrate their understanding
of the prosecutor's stance before the prosecutor ever articulated
it at trial:
THE COURT: Okay. The record should indicate we
are outside the presence of the Jury. Go ahead.
MR. MEANS: Thank you. As part of our request for
discovery we had made request for statements made by
the Defendants.
MR. OLSEN: That wasn't the request.

MR. MEANS: I know that there is a slight
technicality about no recorded statement, and perhaps
the Police Officer that took the statement didn't
record it. But I think in fairness to our request,
where we are asking for statements made by our
clients, and the response to that request is there are
none, that I think the State should have come forward
beforehand to tell us if they had taken statements, if
they were written, recorded, or just memorized. This
is the first time I ever heard any indication of a
statement by my client.
(T. 15, 16). In later oral arguments, defense counsel again
indicated his understanding of the prosecution's stance:
MR. MEANS: Well, Your Honor, nevertheless I'm
going to object. I know that you understand the
background on this objection. We had made requests for
statements made by the Defendant and apparently it was
made for written or recorded statements. It's
customary for Police Officers in the enforcement of
their duties to record statements made by Defendants.
I think, unfairness [sic] to the Defense, when we've
asked for statements, whether we've indicated it as
written or recorded, that they are nevertheless
statements of Defendants and where we've made that
request, they should be provided to us and not
presented to us cold at the trial setting. This is the
first time that I knew that my client, Mr. Warwick
here, had made a statement to the officer, or that the
prosecution intended to use it today.
(T. 43). Mr. Esplin joined in the objection (T. 44).
In later argument to the court, Mr. 01sen indicated
that during a suppression hearing in Sanpete County, that defense
counsel were made aware of his intent to admissions of
defendants:
MR. OLSEN: In addition, at the hearing in Sanpete
County this same thing came up and I advised both the
Court and Counsel that there were admissions made to
the officers, that we relied on. And they asked why
they hadn't been responded to in their discovery
proceedings and my specific answer to them was in your
discovery you asked for written or recorded statements,
and there weren't any that I was aware of.

(T. 47). Mr. Olsen also

indicated that he could present

evidence from a sheriff who had told Mr. Means at a preliminary
hearing, who was representing all three defendants at that time,
about the statements (T. 94). The court informed Mr. Olsen that
his ruling excluding the evidence would stand regardless of the
sheriff's testimony, and told Mr. Olsen that he could make a
record of the sheriff's testimony later, if he so chose (T. 94).
During the suppression hearing referred to by Mr.
Olsen, he indeed told the court and the defendants that the
defendants had made statements to the arresting officers, but
that the prosecution had no written or recorded statements of the
defendants.

At that hearing, Sheriff Ekker was testifying, and

he quoted Mr. Hatch's statement that he didn't know whose cattle
were in the back of his trailer.

At that point, this discussion

between counsel occurred:
MR. ESPLIN: I'll object to any statement made by
the Defendant. We've had response as to a request for
discovery that no statements were made by them.
MR. OLSEN: No. Your request was "any written or
recorded statements." There are statements of the
Defendants that were made to the officers. And I
denied there were any others. We don't have any.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
(T. Supp. Hearing 39, transcript of which will hopefully be
included in the record through this Court's granting a motion for
supplementation, pertinent pages of which transcript are attached
as Appendix A ) .
Many precedents indicate that it is appropriate for
this Court, through reviewing the arguments of counsel prior to
and at trial, to recognize defendants' understanding of the
prosecution's stance and to recognize that defendants, by failing

to seek a court order for the production of oral statements,
destroyed their claim of discovery violation relating to the
prosecution's non-production of those statements.

See State v.

Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah 1981)(defendant's claim of
surprise at discrepancy between preliminary hearing testimony and
trial testimony of witness concerning defendant's statements to
her was belied by defense counsel's own comments at the beginning
of the discussion of that testimony during preliminary hearing);
Gregg v. State, 662 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Okl.Cr. 1983)(defendant's
claim of non-disclosure of discoverable evidence rejected by
court because there

was evidence that defendant had independent

knowledge of evidence); Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F.Supp. 945,
948 (N.D.Okl. 1976)("A prerequisite to relief for non-disclosure
of required information is that the defense did not have
independent knowledge of and access to the evidence in
question.").
In State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980), the
defendant argued on appeal that the prosecution violated his
constitutional rights by failing to produce police reports that
he claimed were exculpatory.
production

Defendant did not request

of the reports prior to or during trial.

At trial, defendant argued that his victim's ability to
perceive the events of the crime was impaired by the injury she
suffered during the crime, while numerous prosecution witnesses
testified about the victim's lucid perception of the events
surrounding the crime.

Police reports, which were not given to

defendant prior to trial, apparently indicated that the victim

was strained, in shock, incoherent, hysterical, and may have
blacked out for a second.

The defendant argued that this

evidence might have been used by the defendant to show the
victim's inability to perceive the crime, and to impeach other
prosecution witnesses.
The Court refused to allow the defendant to raise this
argument:
In any event, we are unwilling to adopt a rule that
permits
defense counsel, by withholding a request for
available evidence, to in effect corrupt a trial and
thereby obtain a retrial. In the instant case the
reports clearly could have been requested. The
existence of police reports must have been known prior
to trial and were referred to at the trial. Both
investigating officers testified, and both expressly
referred to the reports they had made at the scene of
the crime. Generally, evidence is not improperly
withheld if the defense has knowledge of that evidence
and defense counsel simply fails to request it.
Id. at 225.
This Court too, should refuse to accept blindly
defendants' claims of surprise at evidence and prosecutorial
violation of discovery rules, when the defendants' own lack of
diligence during the discovery phase of the trial is the genuine
cause for the nonproduction of evidence.
Under Knight, the prosecution's burden under the rules
of discovery was met prior to trial when the prosecutor indicated
that he would not voluntarily produce oral statements in response
to defendants' discovery request.
Assuming, again strictly for purposes of argument, that
the oral statements were requested, that the prosecutor complied
voluntarily with defendants' discovery requests, and that he
failed to disclose oral statements in violation of the discovery
rules, this hvDothetie»i ermr t^„i^ 1

*

•

Addressing the second step of the Knight test,
evaluation of prejudice, the Knight court stated:
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall
be disregarded."
•• • •

For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a
different outcome must be sufficiently high to
undermine confidence in the verdict. ... Applying Rule
30 to the prosecutor's violations of his discovery
duties, we must determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of [defendant's]
trial would have been more favorable to him had the
prosecution revealed the requested material.
Id. at 919-920.

The burden to show harmless error in this

circumstance falls on the prosecution as soon as the defendant
can make a "credible argument that the prosecutor's errors have
impaired the defense".

Ici. at 921.

As was explained in point I of this brief, the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to convict defendants of theft
of the cattle.

The prosecutor's quotation of defendant Warwick

was never brought into evidence through a witness, and the jurors
were instructed that the statements of the attorneys were not to
be considered evidence in the case (R. 138 Ins. 5; opening
argument of Mr. Esplin, T. 19). See State v. Smith, 700 P.2d
1106, 1112 (Utah 1985)("Furthermore, in its instructions to the
jury, the court included the warning that it must not consider as
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial.").
Under Utah law, if a defendant was at trial, as these defendants
were, aware of the evidence that the prosecution failed to
"disclose", the nondisclosure of the evidence is harmless error.
See State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 113 (Utah 1986)("The

prosecutor's failure to give Slowe written notice of intent to
use the conviction was clearly error; however, the error was
harmless.

Slowe had actual notice of the prosecutor's intent to

use the perjury conviction and on a motion in limine, moved to
suppress it.").

This Court should combine these factors with

defendants' own judgment that the statement now at issue did not
merit a mistrial or continuance when it first arose, and conclude
that the prosecutor's quotation of defendant Warwick was, if
error at all, harmless.
POINT III
DEFENDANTS WAIVED THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT
TO THE REBUTTAL WITNESS TESTIMONY, WHICH THE
PROSECUTION WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO PREDISCLOSE.
Prior to trial, defendants submitted a request for a
list of prosecution witnesses, to which the prosecution responded
voluntarily and repeatedly (R. 13, 26).
During the State's case in chief, the state sought to
admit testimony from two witnesses reflecting defendants' intent
to steal the cattle.
during the arrest,

Sheriff Ekker was going to testify that

defendant Warwick indicated to him that he

did not intend to go to trial on the charges for cattle theft
because he knew he was guilty (T. 50). Officer Brinkerhoff was
going to testify that defendant Warwick asked him "How did you
catch us, with the airplane?", and that defendant Olsen said to
defendant Hatch "I didn't think they'd catch us." (T. 88). This
was the strongest direct evidence in the State's case of
defendants' intent to steal the cattle, and it was excluded by
the trial court.

After Mr. Hatch testified during the defense's case,
professing his lack of intent to steal the cattle, the State
called a rebuttal witness, Donna Young Hatch (T. 168; 176, 177).
Defense counsel objected to her testimony because she was not
listed on the witness list during discovery and because she would
testify to inculpatory statements made by one of the defendants
(T. 186-187).

The prosecutor noted that the court's previous

ruling barred him from presenting the statements of the
defendants in the case in chief, but allowed the admission of the
statements in rebuttal to defendants' testimony at trial (T.
176).

After the prosecution noted that all of the State's

witnesses for the case in chief had been disclosed, and that this
witness was not disclosed because the prosecutor didn't know
whether or not he would need her as a rebuttal witness, the court
allowed Mrs. Hatch to testify (T. 187).
During the State's cross-examination of Mr. Hatch, the
prosecutor asked him if he had made several statements about
intending to steal cattle in the past, which the state intended
to show defendant had made to Mrs. Hatch, his ex-wife (T. 175).
When these statements were addressed in Mrs. Hatch's testimony,
they were excluded by the court under the authority of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-24-8(1), the marital communications privilege, "The
Court has examined the statute and the case notes under the
statute and is of the opinion the objection should be sustained.
So this witness will not be allowed to testify as to any
communications that occurred during the course of the marriage or
afterward, based on the statute." (T. 191). When Mrs. Hatch

testified that discussions concerning cattle occurred after the
divorce these statements were excluded, but the basis of the
exclusion is unintelligible - the basis was either the marital
communications privilege or failure of the prosecution to list
Mrs. Hatch as a witness (T. 193).
Mrs. Hatch's testimony was limited to the statements
that she and defendant Hatch had discussions concerning the
taking of cattle (T. 193), and that they had a conversation
concerning cattle (T. 193). No details were disclosed concerning
these discussions, other than that they occurred in front of the
Hatch children and that they occurred after 1984, during the
months of July, August, September, and October (T. 193).
A. Defendants Waived Their Opportunity To Raise
This Objection On Appeal When They Failed To
Seek A Continuance Or Mistrial At Trial.
At no time during or after Mrs. Hatch's testimony did
defendants seek to mitigate the impact of her testimony through a
motion for a continuance or for a mistrial.

Several cases

demonstrate that defendants' choice at trial to allow this
"surprise" testimony, without rebuttal, to go with the jurors to
their deliberations is a choice that binds defendants on appeal.
See State v. Harris, 14 Wash.App. 414, 542 P.2d 122, 126
(1975)(remedy for defendant, surprised by rebuttal witness
testimony, is request for continuance); Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d
503, 513 (Okla. Cr. 1986)(defendant, surprised by witness not
endorsed on information, must not only object, but must request
continuance);

State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734, 739-

740 (1982)(defendant, surprised by rebuttal witness not endorsed

on information, should have moved for a continuance); People v.
Renfrow, 193 Colo. 131, 564 P.2d 411, 413 (1977)(defendant waived
objection to endorsement of witnesses on day of hearing because
he objected to their testifying, but did not request a
continuance); Daniels v. State, 558 P.2d 405, 412 (Okl.Cr.
1976)(remedy for defendant surprised by witness not endorsed on
information is continuance, and failure to seek one waives
objection); People v. Bailey, 191 Colo. 366, 552 P.2d 1014, 1017
(1976)(defense cannot object to late endorsement of witnesses and
refuse to request continuance); State v. Thomas, 554 P.2d 225,
226-227 (Utah 1976)(defendant failed to follow statutory mandate
to request continuance upon prosecution's 'presentation of
witnesses not indorsed on the information, and thereby waived his
objection).
B. The Prosecution Was Under No Duty To List
Rebuttal Witnesses.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4(j) provides that:
The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment
or information was based shall be endorsed thereon
before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not
affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by
the court on application of the defendant. Upon
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a
showing of good cause, furnish the names of other
witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so
endorsed•
Several courts have interpreted similar requirements for
prosecutorial disclosure of prospective witnesses as limited to
disclosure of case in chief witnesses and excluding rebuttal
witnesses, because prosecutors are not expected to foresee the
route taken by the defense and the prosecution rebuttals thereto.
See McCurry v. State, 538 P.2d 100, 105 (Alaska 1975)("As for

whether rebuttal witnesses come within the purview of the witness
list requirement, the general rule seems to be that they do not,
so long as the rebuttal is true rebuttal and not an attempt to
present the state's case-in-chief in the rebuttal."); State v.
Finneqan, 6 Wash.App. 612, 495 P.2d 674, 682 (1972), cert, denied
Finnegan v. Washington, 410 U.S. 967, (rebuttal witnesses need
not be listed); State v. Binford, 120 Ariz. 86, 584 P.2d 67, 70
(1978)(it was not error to allow three unlisted rebuttal
witnesses to testify after defendant made a last-minute decision
to testify); State v. Sullivan, 635 P.2d 501, 504-505 (Ariz.
1981)("However, it is obviously unreasonable to require the State
to list in advance of trial and prior to the presentation

of the

defendant's case the names of all potential rebuttal witnesses,
since the prosecution can rarely anticipate what course the
defense will pursue."); State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 726, 692 P.2d
370, 383 (1984)(prosecutor's duty to disclose witnesses does not
extend to rebuttal witnesses); Freeman v. State, 681 P.2d 84, 85
(Okl.Cr. 1984)("However, the requirement of pretrial notice
cannot reasonably be applied to rebuttal evidence, since the
State cannot know with certainty prior to trial what evidence may
become relevant for rebuttal.").
In State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734 (1982),
the defendant had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon,
and on appeal he challenged the trial court's admission of
rebuttal testimony from a witness whose identity and testimony
were not provided to defendant prior to trial. After the
prosecution presented its case in chief, the defendant took the

stand and testified that during the crime, he was intoxicated,
and did not intend to commit the crime.

The prosecution called

in rebuttal a witness who had not been previously disclosed, to
testify that the defendant did not seem intoxicated immediately
after the crime, at which time the defendant had told the witness
that the defendant had the victim in the sites of his gun when
the shooting occurred.
The defendant's claim that this evidence could have
been admitted during the case in chief, and was therefore
inadmissible in rebuttal was rejected by the court:
Rebuttal evidence is evidence which explains,
repels, counteracts or disproves evidence which has
been introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party.
•• . *

[T]he fact that evidence may be admissible in the case
in chief does not make it any less rebuttal. The rule
that the admission, in rebuttal, of evidence admissible
in the case in chief rests within the sound discretion
of the trial judge is widely recognized.
Id. at 737-738 (citations omitted).
The Olsen court then reviewed the record before them to
determine whether or not the trial court had abused its
discretion in

allowing the rebuttal witness to testify:

The defendant alleges that he was deprived of any
opportunity in which to prepare a cross examination and
that his expert witness had already been excused. At
trial, however, he did not seek a continuance to enable
him to better meet such evidence, nor did he
specifically claim that he would be prejudiced by the
admission of the testimony. Finally, the defendant
waived any surrebuttal which he may have conducted in
an effort to refute the testimony of Mr. Reeder. Our
review of the record discloses that defendant had a
fair opportunity to impeach or contradict Mr. Reeder's
testimony.

Id. at 738.

In the instant case, defendants were put on notice

of the expected content of Mrs. Hatch's testimony during Mr.
Olsen's cross-examination of defendant Hatch (T. 176), and yet
they never presented any surrebuttal, sought a continuance, or
requested a mistrial.
Mrs. Hatch's testimony was properly presented in
rebuttal.

Other direct evidence of defendants' intent which the

state sought to introduce during the case in chief was of higher
quality than that provided by Mrs. Hatch.

Defendants' statements

to Sheriff Ekker and Officer Brinkerhoff were obviously much
closer in time and physical proximity to the crime at issue than
were the statements made to Mrs. Hatch.

The conversations

between the Hatches had no bearing on the intent of defendants
Warwick and Olsen.

While the relationship of Mrs. Hatch and

defendant Hatch (parents of Hatch children) might have caused
Mrs. Hatch to feel some trepidation at the prospect of
testifying, Sheriff Ekker and Officer Brinkerhoff apparently had
no such relationships with any of the defendants that might cause
the prosecution to avoid the use of their testimony.
Particularly in light of the trial court's ruling forbidding any
testimony concerning defendants' statements prior to their
testifying at trial, and in light of the fact that defendant
Hatch was the only defendant who testified, the prosecutor's
choice to use Mrs. Hatch's testimony in rebuttal was appropriate.
As did the Olsen court, this Court should determine
that the prosecution had no duty to foresee and disclose their
need for Mrs. Hatch's testimony, and that defendants had a fair
opportunity to rebut this evidence, which they waived.

C. If It Was Error For The Trial Court To Allow
Mrs. Hatch To Testify, It Was Harmless Error.
In State v. Wight, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App.
1988), this Court explained that "[e]rror is reversible 'only if
a review of the record persuades the court that without the error
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for
the defendant.'"

Id. at 32 (citations omitted).

Other Utah case law demonstrates that the presentation
of evidence which was not disclosed to the defense prior to trial
is considered harmless if other equally inculpatory evidence is
legitimately admitted at trial. In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656
(Utah 1985), the prosecution's failure to disclose a witness
after voluntary compliance with request for witness list did not
justify a mistrial because the witness only testified that he had
seen the defendant in proximity to the scene of crime after it
was committed, and because other substantial evidence showed the
defendant's guilt.

See also State v. Ott, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 38,

39-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(this Court assumed, but did not
decide, that evidence should have been suppressed, but then found
that the admission was harmless error, because the facts proved
by that evidence were proved by evidence properly admitted).
As was demonstrated in Point I, the evidence of
defendants' guilt was strong in this case, independent of the
testimony of Mrs. Hatch (Mrs. Hatch's contribution to the
evidence presented in Point I was the fact that defendant Hatch
had researched and was interested in obtaining Longhorns).

POINT IV
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON TRANSPORTING CATTLE
WITHOUT A BRAND IS MOOT AT THIS POINT AND WAS
PROPERLY GIVEN AT TRIAL.
The transportation of unbranded cattle instruction was
phrased as a lesser included offense instruction at the request
of the defense (T. 208-209).

The defendants repeatedly raised

the issue of the illegality of failing to brand cattle,
apparently to impress the jurors with the idea that if a cattle
owner illegally fails to brand his cattle, anyone who knows the
law of branding is entitled to take the unbranded cattle (T. 116118, 128; R. 100, 101, 107, 108). It was apparently to
demonstrate that the law governing cattle stewardship does not
condone taking unbranded cattle that the trial court insisted on
including reference to the law which forbids transporting cattle
without proof of ownership (R. 206-207).

After the court refused

to withdraw the instruction, defense counsel requested that the
transportation crime be instructed upon as though it were a
lesser included offense of theft, and the court allowed them to
draft the instruction as they wished (T. 208, 209). That
instruction read:
There is a lesser included offense within the
crime of theft of cattle as charged which provides that
no person may transport cattle without having an
official State brand certificate or other proof of
ownership in his possession.
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Defendant or either of them transported livestock
without a transit permit signed by an owner or his
representative specifying the date of transportation,
place of origin, or loading, destination, date of
issuance and number of head being transported, but did
not intend to deprive the owner thereof, you may find
said defendant Guilty of the lesser included offense of
transporting without a permit.

(R. 141).
A. The Instruction Issue Is Moot Because Defendants
Were Convicted Of The Offense Of Theft.
"[T]he general rule [is] that under ordinary factual
situations where a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater
offense, the giving of an erroneous instruction on a lesser
offense is not deemed prejudicial."

State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d

54, 13 P.2d 422, 424 (1973).
In State v. Hall, 712 P.2d 229 (Utah 1985), the
defendant challenged the trial court's giving of a lesser
included offense instruction, but the court refused to address it
because the jury's conviction of greater offense, following their
having been instructed on the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof, obviated need for judicial examination of
lesser included offense instruction.
The Hall and Valdez cases demonstrate that the question
of whether or not the trial court's giving the jurors the
instruction on transporting cattle was error, is moot because
defendants' jurors were instructed properly on the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof (R. 142), and convicted
defendants of the "greater" offense in this case (R. 164-166).
B. The Instruction On Transporting Cattle Was
Properly Given.
The standards for evaluating claims of improper jury
instructions are set out in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah
1981):
[T]he law in Utah is that jury instructions are to be
considered as a whole... When taken as a whole if they
fairly tender the case to the jury, the fact that one
or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as

full or accurate as they might have been is not
reversible error.
Id. at 542 (citations omitted).

Similarly, in State v. Anselmo,

558 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977), the court explained,
Ordinarily it is error to instruct on abstract
principles of law that are not applicable to the facts
before the jury, and we think it was improper to
include subsection (3) in the instruction given in
this case. However, since there was absolutely no way
the jury could have related the instruction to the
verdict, it was harmless error.
£d. at 1327.
Applying these rules to the instructions given in this
case, this Court should find that, regardless of instruction 9A,
the jurors in this case were properly instructed.

The

instructions given instruct the jurors correctly upon the law
applicable to the case, and the instruction objected to by
defendants on appeal explains that as a lesser included offense,
the crime of transporting cattle without proof of ownership is
relevant only when the jurors are unable to find that the
defendants possessed the requisite mental state for theft.

Given

the language of the instruction to which defendants object, and
the quality of the instructions as a whole, defendants'
contention that instruction 9A influenced the jurors to convict
defendants of theft is implausible, and should be rejected.
POINT V
THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING COMMENTS WERE
PROPER.
The Utah Supreme Court has promulgated a two-part test
for reviewing a prosecutor's comments to the jury
(1) did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they could not properly consider in

determining their verdict, and (2) were the jurors
under the circumstances of the particular case probably
influenced by those remarks.
State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187 (Utah 1986)-

The application

of this test is "within the sound discretion of the trial court
on motion for a new trial.

If there be no abuse of this

discretion and substantial justice appears to have been done, the
appellate court will not reverse the judgment." State v. Valdez,
30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (1973).
In the arguments to the trial court, defendants based
their objection to the testimony on the prosecution's failure to
"disclose" the evidence, and under the authority of Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

As was discussed in point

II, defendants waived these arguments at trial.

As was also

discussed above, the argument is meritless because the oral
statements at issue here were not requested by the defendants.
The prosecutor followed the rules of discovery, while the
defendants, in contrast, although aware of the prosecution's
refusal to provide oral statements in response to defendants'
request for written and recorded statements, neglected pretrial
and trial remedies under the discovery rules (discovery request
for oral statements, motion for court order for oral statements,
motion for continuance or mistrial).
Particularly under the facts of this case (intent was
the only issue in dispute; defendant Hatch testified as to his
innocent intent), defendant Warwick's statement "We are not going
through all that rigmarole ....I'm guilty and I know it." (T. 15)
is not a confession that demonstrates his codefendants' guilt.

Thus# the statement was not necessarily excluded by Bruton.

See

Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed2d 176
(1987)("In Bruton, the codefendant's confession "expressly
implicated] M the defendant as his accomplice.

Thus, at the time

that confession was introduced there was not the slightest doubt
that it would prove "powerfully incriminating."

By contrast, in

this case the confession was not incriminating on its face, and
became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at
trial."); State v. Ellis v. Withers, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah
1987)(To invoke the Bruton doctrine, a statement must be
powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the other
defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate
the complaining defendant in the commission of the crime.").
Under these circumstances, the statement quoted by the
prosecutor was a "matter ... which the jurors could ... properly
consider" as evidence of defendants' intent to steal the cattle.
See State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 457 (Utah 1986)(Prosecutor's
attempt to elicit testimony concerning codefendants' statements
to each other immediately prior to murder was proper effort to
demonstrate defendants' intent.).
Particularly in light of the evidence of defendants'
guilt, this Court should not conclude that the prosecutor's
comment prejudiced defendants.

See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,

486-487 (Utah 1984)(explaining that the weight this Court gives
to an argument of improper prosecutorial comment should be
inversely proportionate to the weight of the evidence against
defendants); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 62 (Utah

1982)("There is reversible error only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that an improper question by the prosecutor so
prejudiced the jury that in its absence there might have been a
different result.").
The cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable
from the present one.

See State v. West, 617 P.2d 1298 (Mon.

1980)(prosecutor, in violation of explicit court order, quoted
inadmissible hearsay evidence during his opening argument, and
defendant moved for a mistrial); State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146
(Utah 1981)(prosecutor five times called attention to defendant's
failure to testify, and defendant objected each time and moved
for a mistrial).
As was noted above in point II, defendants did not seek
any remedies other than exclusion of the evidence referred to by
the prosecutor when the prosecutor made the statement at issue
here.

The fact that defendants have rephrased their "violation

of discovery rules" argument into a "prosecutorial misconduct"
argument does not change the fact that defendants waived this
objection at trial.

In disposing of this issue, this Court

should refer to State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), where
the Utah Supreme Court explained the relevance to an appeal based
on improper prosecutorial comment of a defendant's procedural
conduct following allegedly improper comment by the prosecution:
Furthermore, in its instructions to the jury, the court
included the warning that it must not consider as
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial
and that "[t]he law forbids you to be governed by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice,
public opinion or public feeling." ... this
instruction, without more, clearly would have been
inadequate to cure the defect caused by the

prosecutor's improper remarks. However, consideration
of all the circumstances of this case, including the
nature and extent of the evidence discussed above leads
us to conclude that the jurors were not "probably
influenced by [the] remarks". Additionally, we also
note that the defense did not make any objection to the
prosecutor's remarks at the time they were made, nor
was a special cautionary instruction requested which
could have undone any harm or corrected any
misapprehensions on the part of the jurors
immediately. Likewise, the matter does not appear to
have been called to the trial judge's attention by
means of a request for a mistrial or a new trial,
which suggests that defendant's concerns about
improper influence have arisen in the course of the
preparation of this appeal, rather than from
perceptions at the time of trial. It is therefore our
opinion
that reversal is not warranted.
Id. at 1112-1113 (emphasis added).

See also State v. Lairby, 699

P.2d 1187, 1198 (Utah 1984)(defendants' stipulation to joint
trial waived due process objections related to joinder),
overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d
628, 631, (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
Defendants waived at trial the issues of nonproduction
of oral statements and failure to list Mrs. Hatch as a witness,
and thus, this Court need not reach the merits of points I, II
and IV of the Appellants' Brief.
In the event that this Court chooses to address the
nonproduction issues, defendants' points I and IV should be
rejected because the nonproduction resulted from defense failure
to request oral statements, and from defense failure to pursue
production of the oral statements once they knew that the
prosecution would not produce oral statements in response to a
request for written or recorded statements.

Because the

prosecution's nonproduction of the oral statements was

legitimate, the evidence quoted by the prosecutor but not
presented to the jurors could properly have come before the
jurors, and defendants' points I and IV are meritless.
If point II is addressed on the merits, it should be
rejected because the prosecution was under no duty to disclose
this rebuttal witness, because her testimony was properly
admitted, and because other evidence of defendants' guilt renders
any possible error harmless.
The propriety of the trial court's giving a jury
instruction drafted by defendants at their request as a lesser
included offense of theft instruction is moot because the jurors
found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft.

If

this Court chooses to address defendants' point III, it too
should be rejected because the instruction was appropriate in the
context of this case and because the instructions as a whole
properly instructed the jurors, and no prejudicial error occurred
as a result of instruction 9A.
A review of the evidence presented through defendant
Hatch and the other witnesses, and consideration of inferences
that might be drawn from that evidence demonstrate that
defendants' jurors were acting within reason in convicting
defendants of theft.
Defendants' convictions should be affirmed.
DATED this
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day of February, 1989.
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